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Non-Technical Summary
Since the start of EMU national fiscal policy in the Eurozone can be conducted
almost without paying any attention to the exchange rate. At least for a small EMU
member country there is no longer any perceivable link between national fiscal
behaviour and movements of the nominal exchange rate. This might reduce fiscal
discipline if in the past the threat of exchange rate pressure as a punishment for lax
fiscal policy was important.
It is the aim of this paper to shed light on the empirical relevance of these
considerations for a panel of industrial countries. The basic approach is based on the
following idea: The end of the depreciation threat after the introduction of the Euro
can be expected to matter if in the past different kinds of exchange rate regimes have
been significant determinants of fiscal behaviour. From theoretical considerations –
performed in a complementary paper (Heinemann, 1998a) – the depreciation threat
should be more effective under a regime of fixed exchange rates than under floating.
Basically, this result originates from the assumption that nominal exchange rate
movements receive more attention as a political objective if a government has
committed itself to keeping the exchange rate stable.
Besides the exchange rate regime a number of further standard and non-standard
variables are included to explain the dependent fiscal variable which is the primary
deficit. Standard variables in the explanation of the deficit include growth and
unemployment but also political-economic variables such as government durability
and type of government. The latter variables have proven to be quite successful in
explaining some of the variance in debt performance of industrial countries. Openness
of an economy measured as exposure to trade is included as a proxy for the sensitivity
to exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, for the EU countries in the 90s a
Maastricht variable is included that is based on the rate of Euro acceptance in the
population according to Eurobarometer opinion polls. This variable is to reflect the
disciplining effects of the convergence criteria specifically for EU member countries.
This variable together with a general dummy for the 90s serves also the purpose to
test the hypothesis whether the consolidation since 1990 was Maastricht induced or a
general consequence of a new world-wide fiscal philosophy. In addition, the
existence of capital controls is taken into account because such restrictions can be
expected to limit disciplining pressure from foreign exchange markets. Finally, an
exchange rate crisis indicator is constructed and included. This is motivated by the
idea that crisis might sometimes be a precondition for corrections.
On the basis of this set of variables a dynamic fixed effects panel estimation is
performed for the period 1971 to 1996 for 20 OECD countries. Not surprisingly, the
cyclical variables growth rate and change of the unemployment rate are highly
significant. The political-economic variables are also improving the explanatory
power of the regression. The dummy for the 90s is insignificant while the Maastricht
variable is significant with the expected sign. A central result concerns the impact of
exchange rate regimes: The regime dummies do not have a measurable impact.
Neither is this the case for currency crises. In contrast to that stands the result for the
openness variable which is highly significant: The more open a country, the higher is
its primary surplus.
The cautious conclusions are the following: The exchange rate regime as such seems
to be irrelevant for the determination of the politically optimal fiscal balance. This
result in itself leads to an optimistic view on fiscal discipline under EMU, as there is
no problem with the end of the depreciation threat because this threat did not work in
the past either. On the other hand, however, there is the clear result that a high degree
of openness has a deficit reducing impact. Although evidence for the relevance of the
exchange rate channel in this context is lacking there are mechanisms at work by
which small open economies are induced to have bigger surpluses than large closed
economies. This is a worrying result in the EMU context since the single currency
will accelerate integration and transform a group of relatively small and very open
economies into a single Euroland economy with a low degree of openness. The study
underlines the efficacy of the Maastricht criteria. It is a popular hypothesis that not
the criteria but economic necessity dictated the consolidation and that therefore
consolidation can be expected to continue after EMU’s start.  This hypothesis is
rejected by the above findings.
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11 Introduction
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that strong depreciations of currencies put
economic policy under pressure to embark on reforms. Recent examples are the
currency crises of the Asian countries where sliding currencies have provoked the call
for structural reforms. Within Europe, Italy of the early nineties seems to be a similar
example where a weak domestic currency had the function to put pressure on
economic policy to adjust in order to qualify for EMU. An often cited example of the
disciplining power of foreign exchange markets is France in the first years of
president Mitterand, where the return to fiscal restraint is attributed to the
commitment of a franc fort in the EMS. The basic story is simple: Bad behaviour - i.e.
high deficits - tend to bring an exchange rate under pressure. This pressure leads to a
feeling of economic crisis in the relevant country. This feeling might come up the
more intensively, the more the exchange rate has been declared to be a political target
and it might overcome resistance to unpleasant reforms. With other words: Crisis is a
precondition of reform because it helps politicians to overcome reform blockades put
up by interest groups (Rodrik, 1996). Exchange rate pressure is one important
dimension of such a “helpful” crisis.
Thus the central questions that are analysed in this paper are the following: Is there a
disciplining function of foreign exchange markets in regard to economic policy,
particularly in regard to fiscal policy? Does this disciplining function depend on the
characteristics of the exchange rate regime? What does this imply for fiscal behaviour
under EMU? While the focus of this paper is empirical, a theoretically guided
analysis of the same questions is given in a complementary paper (Heinemann,
1998a).
The importance of these questions can be motivated easily. This complex has an
obvious relation to central issues in present economic debates such as globalisation
and EMU. Globalisation is often said to restrict the leeway of national politicians for
sovereign decisions. Restrictions that arise from foreign exchange markets are one
potential reason for the loss of national sovereignty. The relevance of the above
questions in the EMU context is even more straightforward. In Europe, with the
introduction of the Euro a fundamental change of the exchange rate regime has taken
place. While before 1999 the external stability of these national currencies was
always also influenced by domestic economic policy, with EMU the stability of the
nominal exchange rate within the Euro zone is given by definition. It is an obvious
presumption that this relaxation of economic restrictions has an impact on the
behaviour of those agents responsible for fiscal policy. This idea gains some support
from the experience with the other major change of the global exchange rate system,
the collapse of the Br tton Wood system of fixed exchange rates. This change in the
early seventies marked a turning point for fiscal behaviour in the direction of a fast
2growth of public debt. McKinnon (1996) interprets this as a logical connection due to
the fact that the advent of floating increased the degrees of freedom for economic
policy.
Thus, there seems to be the danger that EMU could have a similar effect of
destroying a  disciplining restriction in Europe. Taking into account the questions
concerning the sustainability of deficit reductions that have taken place in the EMU
qualification period, this is a complex of some importance. If the transition to
monetary union as such weakens fiscal discipline then the probability is high that
there will be again increasing deficits after the convergence criteria have lost their
power in May 1998, when 11 countries received the EMU ticket. To put the same
issue in a slightly other context: It is an open debate in the economic analysis whether
the Pact for Stability and Growth is a sensible institution or whether it would be
sufficient to trust in market discipline. The loss of disciplining pressure resulting from
nominal exchanges tends to weaken market discipline. If this pressure had a
significant function in the past then this would be an argument in f vor of institutions
such as the Stability Pact - albeit not necessarily in its chosen specific construction.
In the following section, the relationship between exchange rate regimes and fiscal
discipline is discussed and empirically testable hypotheses are derived.  In section 3,
the relevant variables are presented and first descriptive data analysis is performed.
Subsequently, estimation results for a panel of 20 OECD countries for the impact of
exchange rate regime and other variables on deficits are presented. In the final
section, conclusions for fiscal discipline under a monetary union are drawn.
2 Exchange Rate Regimes and Public Deficits: Theoretical
Considerations
In the analysis of the impact of the exchange rate regime on fiscal behaviour there
needs to be an initial decision concerning the focus on a particular fiscal variable. In
principle very different fiscal variables might be affected such as the size of the
government sector or the structure of government revenues and expenditures. Instead
of looking on these variables the focus will be on public deficits. Thus this study is to
contribute also to the ongoing research on the determinants of public debt. This
research is motivated by both the rising levels and the rising cross sectional diversity
of public debt in industrial countries since the seventies.
Very different approaches have more or less successfully been used to explain the
empirical facts, for a survey see Alesina and Perotti (1995): According to the fiscal
illusion theory in the tradition of Buchanan and Wagner (1977) deficits are popular
because the Ricardian equivalence does not hold due to voters’ difficulties to
understand the government budget constraint. These difficulties are the more
3pronounced the more complicated and intransparent a fiscal system is. Apart from
voters’ ignorance Ricardian equivalence is invalidated by restricted time horizons of
voters. If there is no sufficient intergenerational altruism the present generation will
decide to live at the costs of future generations. This reason for the political attraction
of public deficits seems to be increasingly relevant taking into account demographic
and socio-economic developments as the decreasing fertility and the weakening of
direct intergenerational links in modern society (Heinemann, 1994). There are also
strategic approaches to the debt puzzle. In the presence of political polarisation and
short expected durability of a government, the  government in power can use high
deficits to create facts for the successor with its different ideological preferences
(Persson and Svensson, 1989). This corresponds to empirical findings that countries
with a large extent of political polarisation or short average durability of governments
tend to have larger deficits.   With von Hagen (1992) the interest has shifted towards
the analysis of budgetary institutions. Budgetary procedures such as the decisions
making process between government, finance minister and the parliament have
successfully been used to explain national differences in different public
indebtedness.
With this background what could be the additional explanatory power of exchange
rate regimes for public deficits?  The basic idea is the following as it was set up more
formally in Heinemann (1998a). As the above summarized literature has worked out,
deficits are politically attractive for a number of reasons. In contrast to that, deficits
might as well have politically costly consequences resulting from macroeconomic
interdependencies. These costs are largely ignored in the public choice literature.
There can be interest rate effects leading to higher debt payments on the existing
stock of public debt. Deficits can also lead to exchange rate depreciations that are
politically unattractive because voters take the depreciation as a signal for a failure of
economic policy. So there is a trade-off between the benefits from a deficit and the
costs resulting from its macroeconomic consequences. An essential point is that the
exchange rate regime has a potential to affect this trade-off over different channels.
These channels are
- the political objective function,
- the macroeconomic interdependencies
- and the government budget constraint.
4Political Objective Function
The exchange rate regime is of relevance for the political objective function. The
nominal exchange rate can be expected to be a more important political objective
under some kind of fixed exchange rate system than under a free float. If politicians
commit themselves to stabilize the nominal exchange rate this increases the weight of
exchange rate stability in the political objective function. On the contrary, under
monetary union the nominal exchange rate ceases to be an objective by definition
within the group of countries with the common currency.
Macroeconomic Interdependence
The exchange rate system is an important determinant for the macroeconomic
interdependencies. In particular, the interest determination is affected. The interest
rate differential between the domestic and a reference country is influenced by the
expected exchange rate changes and a risk premium for the exchange rate risk.
Clearly, the exchange rate system is of relevance for these components. Therefore,
the domestic interest rate might react in a different way to public deficits depending
on the exchange rate regime. This will the more be the case if there is a connection
between the exchange rate regime and bailout expectations - although this is not a
necessary condition for the relevance of the exchange rate regime in this context.
Government Budget Constraint
Finally, over the impact on the variables of the macroeconomic system, the
government budget constraint is affected. Besides the mentioned interest rate effect
relevant for the debt service, on the revenue side taxation and seigni rage could be
affected by the choice of an exchange rate regime. A fixed exchange rate will clearly
be a more serious obstacle for controlling seigniorage than it is the case under
floating. Locational and tax competition could evolve more intensively with reduced
exchange rate risks typical in a fixed exchange rate environment or even more under
monetary union.
In Heinemann (1998a) some of these general considerations are analysed in a simple
model where the fiscal authority maximises an objective function under the
constraints of a specific macroeconomic system. This system is constructed in line
with the monetary approach to the exchange rate. Apart from its standard assumptions
such as constant output, purchasing power parity and perfect substitutability between
foreign and domestic currency assets, there are some extensions to the model.
Domestic monetary supply is assumed to react positively to public deficits which
creates a link between fiscal policy variables and the nominal exchange rate. In
addition, there is a default risk premium positively influenced by a debt increase.
5In this setting, fixed exchange rates lead - relative to floating - to a lower level of
primary deficit that is optimal from the point of view of the fiscal authority. This
outcome simply results from the fact that the nominal exchange rate receives more
attention as a political objective under a fixed exchange rate regime than under
floating.
The message for fiscal discipline in a monetary union in this model world is
ambiguous because there are counteracting effects. On the one hand the transition to
monetary union necessarily cuts the link between domestic deficit and monetary
expansion due to the supranationalization of monetary policy. Thus, the partial control
of seigniorage by the fiscal authority is lost which tends to foster discipline. In the
model, a given primary deficit leads to a larger increase in the debt level under
monetary union than under any other regime. On the other hand a nominal
depreciation threat for lax fiscal policy does not exist any longer. With these opposite
effects, the model conclusion is that for low debt countries where a lot of attention is
paid to the exchange rate, the introduction of monetary union will rather tend to
weaken fiscal discipline. In contrast to that, for high debt countries with a “benign
neglect” stance on the exchange rate monetary union implies more fiscal discipline.
In preparing the ground for the empirical analysis there is the obvious problem that
the results for the monetary union regime can not be tested for industrial countries
after the second world war. EMU is the first case study for modern industrial
countries introducing a monetary union regime. Instead, the impact of fixed rates and
floating can be measured which again will be helpful to draw indirect conclusions for
the empirical foundation of the statements concerning monetary union. If exchange
rate regime related variables do not matter, then the theoretically derived conclusions
for monetary union will probably not be relevant either.
It is necessary to underline the essential precondition for the hypothesis of exchange
rate based fiscal discipline: it is based on the assumption that fiscal imbalances tend
to lead to a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Although this is not an
undisputed assumption it is nevertheless consistent with a large class of models and
with empirical findings (see Heinemann, 1998a, for a short summary of these models
and recent empirical findings).
The theoretical considerations provide the following hypotheses that might offer a
starting point for empirical testing:
- Fixed exchange rate regimes should be associated with lower deficits because the
negative implications of deficits for exchange rate stability are politically more
costly than under floating. For the different types of exchange rate fixing there
should be a relation of the following type: The more restrictive the exchange rate
target the more intense the resulting disciplining pressure on fiscal policy.
6- Countries with a high sensitivity to exchange rate movements should behave more
disciplined. In these countries the depreciation costs of a given deficit are higher. A
proxy for the sensitivity towards exchange rate changes is the openness of a
country. It may happen that there are certain periods with a particular sensitivity to
nominal exchange rate changes. In Europe, the qualification period for participation
in EMU is such an example. Here, exchange rate changes were politically very
costly for a country seeking EMU membership. Thus, this Maastricht effect can
also be tested.
- Exchange rate pressure resulting from high deficits should be the lower the lower is
capital mobility. If there are restrictions to capital mobility, exchange rate based
discipline should consequently be less effective.
- Exchange rate crises should matter for subsequent fiscal behaviour. If crisis is truly
the precondition for reform, after a crisis there should be attempts to correct fiscal
imbalances.
3 Discussion of Relevant Variables and Data
The impact of exchange rate regimes and exchange rate crises is analysed on the basis
of a country panel including 20 OECD countries for the period 1970 until 1997.
Table 1: Countries included in the Panel
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
United
Kingdom
United States
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Data on fiscal policy variables, employment and growth originate from the OECD
data base Fiscal Position and Business Cycles.
3.1 Primary Deficit as the Endogenous Variable
The primary deficit, i.e. the public deficit excluding interest payments, will be the
endogenous variable concentrated upon in this study. There are different justifications
for this choice. The first one is that interest payments on the stock of debt can not be
directly controlled by present fiscal policy. These payments are exogenously
determined by interest rates and the stock of debt inherited. Secondly, the
concentration on the primary deficit reduces endog neity problems, since the interest
rate payments on the stock of debt might be influenced by the fiscal stance. The
second reason comes from the political-economic analysis of debt determinants: The
7primary deficit is the best indicator for the political benefits of deficits in the presence
of fiscal illusion or in the absence of intergenerational altruism. The primary deficit
measures the extent of “spending without taxing” (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977).
Paying interest to bondholders is nothing from which political advantages arise. Of
course, the primary deficit is also not perfectly controlled by the fiscal authority due
to the impact of the business cycle on taxes and expenditure. This leads to the
question how the primary deficit is to be cyclically adjusted in order to identify
autonomous fiscal decisions. The approach here is the following: Instead of
transforming the endogenous variable by a method of cyclical adjustment before
explaining it in the regression, it will be used unadjusted while the growth and the
unemployment rate will be among the explaining variables.
3.2 Exchange Rate Regimes
In the analysis, dummy variables for the exchange rate regime are constructed. The
data used originate from the annual reports Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions by the IMF. The relevant reference day deciding the classification for
each year is the 31st of December. On the basis of the reports three classes are built:
The dummy FER (fixed exchange rate) stands for a peg either in relation to a single
currency or to a composite of currencies. Such a peg normally implies that
fluctuations are limited to 1 percent on either side of the target exchange rate. The
dummy LFLEX stand for the case of limited flexibility with respect to a single
currency or within a cooperative arrangement for which the most important example
is the ERM of the EMS. In this medium class there is no rigid peg, but there is some
kind of formal target zone restricting the currency’s fluctuations in a significant way.
Finally the dummy MFLEX stands for more flexible arrangements which can be more
or less be defined as a floating exchange rate regime.
In classifying the regimes on the basis of the description by the IMF it was put more
weight on de facto regimes than on de jure conditions as can be demonstrated by the
example of Austria. In the case of the Austrian Schilling the formal arrangement in the
80s up to the EMS entry is floating which obviously does not reflect the de facto
regime characterised by a peg to the DM. The exchange rate regime of Austria as
classified in this study for the 80s is a peg. Another classification problem concerns
the currencies of the EMS after August 1993, when the intervention thresholds of the
currencies participating in the ERM, except those of the DM and the Netherlands
guilder, were widened from +/-2,25% to +/-15% around the bilateral central exchange
rates. The size of this fluctuation band is an argument for classifying these cases as
floating. Nevertheless, in this case the formal classification as a case of limited
flexibility was followed because the Maastricht criteria included exchange rate
stability and large fluctuations would have endangered EMU membership - even if
8there was a controversy whether the pre- or the post-1993 fluctuation band was
relevant for the qualification.
In Figure 1 the distribution of exchange rate regimes is depicted. While in the end of
the 60s the fixed exchange rate class still included all 20 countries, this situation
changed in the early 70s with the collapse of the Bretton Wood System. The fixed
exchange rate case became almost irrelevant while floating and - for the EU countries
- the limited flexibility class gained importance.
Figure 1: Distribution of Exchange Rate Regimes in the OECD
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Based on the classification of IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions for 20 OECD countries.
The scatter plot of figure 2 shows the position of 17 OECD countries in regard to
change of the debt-GDP-ratio (this variable is not available for all 20 countries) and
the number of years with floating in each country. In Europe there seems to be a
relation of the kind that countries where floating was predominant tended to have the
largest debt increases, although there are counterexamples such as Great Britain.
Figure 2: Change of debt level and exchange rate regime
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3.3 Openness
The degree of openness of a country seems to be an adequate proxy for the sensitivity
of a country towards exchange rate fluctuations. In countries with low export- and
import-GDP ratios enterprises, households and as a consequence politicians are less
affected by these fluctuations than in countries with high ratios. A “benign neglect”
attitude seems to be a privilege of a relatively closed country such as the USA. In this
study, openness is measured as the mean of the import- and export-GDP-ratio
(variable name OPEN). Table 2 shows the cross-country and time series variation of
this indicator. According to this indicator of globalisation there was an intensive
opening of economies particularly in the seventies up to the eighties - while from
1985 onwards neither the average level nor the range of this indicator shows a further
increase.
Table 2: Openness measured as (Exports/GDP + Imports/GDP)/2
1965 1975 1985 1995
Unweighted Mean 22.5 26.8 33.7 33.5
Maximum 45.8 48.2 75.0 74.0
Minimum 4.7 7.9 8.4 8.9
Data: IMF International Financial Statistics
The variables degree of openness and debt increase since 1970 are characterised by a
negative correlation (figure 3). Only the extrema behave atypical: Belgium with its
maximum openness shows a large debt increase and the USA with its minimum
openness experienced only a modest debt increase.
Figure 3: Openness and debt increase 1970-1997
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3.4 Maastricht
Since the Maatricht treaty had been signed in December 1991, the qualification
criteria for EMU served as a disciplining device for national fiscal policy in the EU
countries. A failure to reduce deficits below the limit of 3 percent of the GDP would
have endangered EMU membership. The Maastricht effect can be interpreted in the
context of a game between the fiscal authority and rent seeking interest groups that
are interested in both EMU and high public spending. By the availability of the EMU
exclusion threat the fiscal authority gets more powerful in negotiating deficit
reductions (Heinemann, 1998b). From this perspective, it is not merely EU
membership that should determine fiscal behaviour but also the popularity of EMU in
each EU country. In a country with a large support for a single European currency the
exclusion threat has more power than in a country with a majority of Eurosceptics.
The data show clearly a positive correlation between Euro support and the change of
the adjusted primary surplus for the EU countries (see figure 4).
The variable EUROACC (Euro Acceptance) used to measure the M astric t effect in
the econometric analysis is defined as follows: It is zero for non-EU countries for all
periods and for EU countries before 1991. From 1991 onwards the variable measures
the net support for a single European currency (difference between percentage share
of population for and against the Euro) as reported in Eurobarometer, the semi-annual
report on public opinion polls by the European Commission.  For each year the
average of both polls was constructed. Because the Euro acceptance question was
posed only from 1993 onwards, the 1993 results were also taken for 1991 and 1992.
A similar approach was also taken by Rotte and Zimmermann (1998). These authors,
however, used the general variable public support for European Union to explain
public deficits. Following these authors the simple dummy DUM91 which is equal to
one from 1991 onwards for all countries is also included. This variable controls for a
sometimes suggested world-wide turn to a more conservative fiscal policy in the
nineties which was independent from the Maastricht criteria.
Figure 4: Euro support and change of adjusted primary surplus
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Support for the Euro is the difference in percentage points between “for” and “against” answers to the question on
preference for or against a common currency in EUROBAROMETER, average 1993-1997. For Sweden, Finland and
Austria the average is based on 1995-1997. The adjusted primary surplus originates from OECD Fiscal Position and
Business Cycle.
3.5 Capital Mobility
If there is exchange rate pressure on lax fiscal politicians it can expected to be less
intense under a low degree of capital mobility. The information of the IMF’s report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions is used in this context. These
reports include information on which kind of restrictions are applied in a member
country for current account restrictions and for capital account restrictions. The
presence of significant current account restrictions is represented by the dummy
variable RESCUR, the presence of significant capital account restrictions by the
dummy variable RESCAP. A restriction is assessed to be significant if it is generally
applied to all foreign transactions. For example embargo restrictions related only in
relation to specific countries are not included. A typical example for a significant
capital account restriction is the necessity of a prior approval for a capital export. A
mere obligation to supply the authorities with information on the international
transaction is not regarded as significant. A further dummy tried in this study (ART8)
is the acceptance of article VIII of the IMF statutes which obliges the member
country to abolish restrictions on current account  transactions - albeit for a not
further limited transitional period an article VIII country can keep up these
restrictions.
Obviously the focus on the de jure situation is not completely satisfying. In particular,
the acceleration of capital mobility caused by technological innovations and the fast
development of financial market infrastructure in the recent years is not adequately
measured by this concept. The variables used represent, however, an important aspect
of the whole capital mobility complex and have the advantage to be official and to be
easily available.
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3.6 Political-economic Variables
Political-economic variables such as government durability and type of government
(coalition versus multi-party) have proven to be quite successful in explaining some of
the variance in debt performance of industrial countries (see the survey by Alesina
and Perotti, 1995). Therefore, some of these variables are included. EOC (election or
cabinet reshuffle) is a variable counting general elections and significant changes in
the government which can also be a cabinet reshuffle. CI is a dummy for a significant
change in the governing ideology. Thus while CI measures a major political change,
EOC measures also phenomena like intra-party or intra-coalition instability. NP
measures the number of parties participating in the governing coalition. These
political-economic variables originate from Lane, McK y and Kenneth (1997) and
from Keesing’s Record of World Events.
3.7 Exchange Rate Crisis Indicator
The notion of exchange rate markets disciplining fiscal behaviour is based on the
assumption that exchange rate crises are politically costly because they are perceived
by voters as a sign of domestic policy’s failure. In addition, an atmosphere of crisis
might be helpful to implement unpopular measures such as expenditure cuts or tax
increases. Therefore the appearance of exchange rate crises could be tested regarding
their impact on fiscal behaviour afterwards. Of course, this approach is burdened with
endogeneity problems. Foreign exchange markets are forward looking. If a fiscal
deterioration is correctly anticipated a crisis is followed by increasing deficits. On the
other hand, the empirical literature on the determinants on exchange rate crises (see
the short survey in Heinemann, 1998a) shows that it is hard to forecast why in some
cases crises happen and in other cases not. Therefore it is difficult for politicians to
assess whether their fiscal stance is compatible with quiet forex markets or not. The
actual appearance of an exchange rate crises is a proof of the incompatibility and
forces a correction.
In constructing an exchange rate crisis indicator the conceptual approach by
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) is followed. These authors argue correctly
that it would be flawed to restrict the identification of an exchange crisis to cases of
large exchange rate changes. This would wrongly exclude situations of speculative
attacks on a currency that are successfully defended and that pass by without an
exchange rate change. These cases can be detected by other variables such as the
development of short term interest rates and official foreign currency reserves.
Consequently, the indicator of currency crises should take into account these
variables as well. The construction of the indicator used here is as follows: Monthly
decreases of official reserves, depreciations of nominal exchange rates and increases
of short term interest rate differentials are calculated. Point of reference is either
Germany and the DM (for European countries) or the USA and the US-Dollar for the
13
rest. Point of reference for Germany are the USA and the US-Dollar and vice versa.
The three components are weighted by each variable’s standard deviation and added
up with equal shares. A currency crisis is defined to take place whenever this monthly
indicator exceeds 2 standard deviations. Figure 5 shows for each year the number of
such defined currency crises which mirrors exchange rate history and events such as
the slowly breaking up of the Bretton Woods system since the late 60s or the
currency crises in Europe in the years 1992/1993. In the analysis based on yearly data
below this crisis indicator is used in form of the variable CRIS counting for each year
and each country the number of exchange rate crises.
Figure 5: Number of exchange rate crises per year in 20 OECD countries
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4 Estimation Results
Table 3 presents the results for a dynamic fixed effects panel estimation (least squares
with White heteroscedasticity-consistent covariances) for the primary surplus in two
specifications. The first specification includes all above introduced variables while the
second drops the insignificant ones from the first regression.
Not surprisingly, the cyclical variables growth rate and change in the unemployment
rate are highly significant with the expected sign. The dummy for the 90s which is to
control for an alleged general turn towards fiscal conservatism in industrial countries
is insignificant. For EU countries it is acceptance of the Euro that has been helpful for
improving the fiscal balance. The hypothesis that the success of European countries in
reducing deficits in the nineties is the consequence of a global change in thinking
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about deficits is thus rejected. Instead, it was clearly the Euro qualification process
that had a major and EU specific impact.
The exchange rate regime has no measurable impact on the primary surplus. The
dummies for flexible regimes (MFLEX) and limited flexibility (LFLEX) do not
indicate significant differences to the reference case of fixed exchange rates. Neither
is this the case for currency crises. However, the openness of a country proves to be
highly significant. The more open a country, the higher its primary surplus - all other
things equal.
Under the political variables the number of elections and cabinet reshuffles (EOC) -
which is an indicator for political instability - proves to impact negatively on the
primary surplus: The higher the degree of instability the higher are deficits in a given
cyclical situation.
Two interactions are significant: The absence of capital account restrictions and a
high degree of openness reduce the cyclical reaction of the surplus. This is consistent
with a disciplining view: In a recession a country can less afford to let the deficit
increase the more open it is and the less restrictions there are on the capital account.
The fixed effects can be interpreted as indicators of conditional stability. A very low
fixed effect signals that a country has lower surpluses than it should be expected on
the basis of the included variables. This hints on the existence of specific national
characteristics which are particularly deficit inducing. Figure 6 shows deviations of
individual fixed effects from Germany as the point of reference. Four countries have
significantly a higher conditional inclination for deficit spending than Germany: Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland.
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Primary Surplus
Dependent variable: annual primary surplus in per cent of GDP
Sample: 1971 1996, yearly data, 20 Countries, 460 Observations
Pooled least squares with fixed effects and White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values
Exogeneous variable Coefficients
(White t-value)
PRIMSURP (-1) 0.68***
(11.93)
0.69***
(13.19)
REAL GROWTH RATE
(D(LOG(GDPV))
20.83***
(3.71)
20.18***
(3.99)
D(UNR) -0.87***
(-5.44)
-0.84***
(-5.41)
EUROACC 0.0344***
(4.47)
0.033***
(4.20)
DUM91 -0.092
(-0.51)
OPEN 0.047***
(2.57)
0.047***
(2.49)
LFLEX -0.21
(-0.71)
MFLEX 0.017
(0.04)
RESCAP -0.078
(0.33)
RESCUR -0.37
(-0.72)
ART8 0.39
(1.12)
NP 0.16
(1.34)
CI -0.14
(-0.59)
EOC -0.26*
(-1.94)
-0.29***
(-2.38)
CRIS -0.082
(-0.70)
REAL GROWTH*(1-RESCAP) -14.47*
(-1.95)
-12.71**
(2.26)
OPEN*D(UNR) 0.010**
(2.29)
0.0096**
(2.23)
USA -0.82* -0.73***
JPN -1.04 -1.131***
GER -1.31* -1.26**
FRAU -1.40 -1.45***
ITA -2.93*** -2.50***
GBR -1.37* -1.31**
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CAN -1.37* -1.30***
AUS -0.97 -0.94**
AUT -2.13*** -2.05***
BEL -3.28** -2.87***
DNK -0.61 -0.57
ESP -1.73*** -1.48***
FIN -1.51 -1.01
GRC -2.00** -1.89***
IRE -3.91*** -3.92***
NLD -2.88*** -2.70***
NOR -1.63 -1.55*
NZL -0.52 -0.48
PRT -2.16*** -2.07***
SWE -1.82** -1.72***
adj. R2 0.73 0.73
DW 2.09 2.07
***/**/*: significance of 1%/2.5%/5% (one-sided test). See text and appendix for data definitions and sources.
Figure 6: Deviations of fixed effects from Germany’s
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***/**/*: fixed effect different from Germany according to Wald c efficient test at significance level of
1%/2.5%/5%.
5 Conclusions
There are a number of caveats that have to be taken into account before drawing
conclusions. The exchange rate regime variables might not be differentiated enough.
For example the class of limited flexibility exchange rate regimes includes on the one
hand frequent adjusters and on the other hand cases that are stable for a long time.
Furthermore, there are problems with a potential endogeneity of this variable:
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Politicians might opt for a certain exchange rate regime according to their fiscal
preferences. The dummies measuring capital mobility refer solely to the de jure
situation and not to the de facto degree of capital mobility. Keeping these limitations
in mind, the empirical results can be related to the initial question how EMU and the
end of the depreciation threat might affect fiscal behaviour.
The following picture emerges: On the one hand there is no support for the hypothesis
that fixed exchange rates had a disciplining function, the exchange rate regime as
such seems to be irrelevant for the determination of the politically optimal fiscal
balance. This result in itself leads to an optimistic view on fiscal discipline under
EMU, as there is no problem with the end of the depreciation threat because this
threat did not work in the past either.
On the other hand, however, there is the clear result that a high degree of openness
has a deficit reducing impact. Although evidence for the relevance of the exchange
rate channel in this context is lacking there are mechanisms at work by which small
open economies are induced to have bigger surpluses than large closed economies.
This is a worrying result in the EMU context since the single currency will accelerate
integration and transform a group of relatively small and very open economies into a
single Euroland economy with a low degree of openness (see Figure 7). The increase
in internal capital mobility that can be expected for Euroland after the introduction of
the Euro does not counteract this effect at least on the basis of the capital mobility
variables that are included here - apart from the one interacting variable there is no
evidence for capital mobility disciplining fiscal policy.
The study underlines the efficacy of the Maastricht criteria. In is a popular hypothesis
that not the criteria but economic necessity dictated the consolidation and that
therefore consolidation can be expected to continue after EMU’s start.  This
hypothesis is rejected by the above findings. There is a highly significant Maa tricht
effect influencing fiscal behaviour of EU countries in the EMU qualification period.
The exclusion threat was particularly effective in those countries whose populations
welcome the Euro. Obviously, in these EU member states citizens and interest groups
were ready to accept sacrifices in order to support qualification. This finding raises
questions for the future fiscal stance after the exclusion threat has disappeared. At the
same time it is an argument supporting a continuing institutional limitation of
government debt by EU legislation such as it has been established in form of the pact
for stability and growth.
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Figure 7: Openness (Ratio of Sum of Exports and Imports to GDP, 1995)
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7 Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Name Definition Source
PRIMSURP ratio of government primary
surplus to GDP
OECD FPBS
GDPV real GDP OECD FPBS
UNR OECD unemployment rate OECD FPBS
FER dummy equal to one for fixed
exchange rate regime - zero
otherwise
IMF EAER
LFLEX dummy equal to one for limited
flexibility exchange rate regime -
zero otherwise
IMF EAER
MFLEX dummy equal to one for floating
exchange rate regime - zero
otherwise
IMF EAER
RESCAP dummy equal to one if there exist
significant capital account
restrictions - zero otherwise
IMF EAER
RESCUR dummy equal to one if there exist
significant current account
restrictions - zero otherwise
IMF EAER
ART8 dummy equal to one if Art. VIII
IMF Statutes is accepted - zero
otherwise
IMF EAER
OPEN (exports and imports)/2*GDP calculated from IMF IFS data
EUROACC net Euro acceptance in EU member
countries from 1991 onwards - 0
otherwise
calculated from
EUROBAROMETER
NP number of parties in government
coalition
Lane et al. (1997), Keesing’s
CI dummy equal to one if there was a
change of governing ideology - zero
otherwise
Lane et al. (1997), Keesing’s
EOC number of elections or cabinet
reshuffles
Lane et al. (1997), Keesing’s
CRIS number of exchange rate crisescalculated from IMF IFS data
DUM91 dummy equal to one from 1991
onwards - zero otherwise
OECD FPBS: OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles database
IMF EAER: IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
IMF IFS: IMF International Financial Statistics
